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 FROM THE EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION BY CLARK BUTLER, PAGES 1-3 
 
The essays in this volume largely express ways in which the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been interpreted and used by those who are active in 
disciplines other than international human rights law. A large body of literature shows that there 
is considerable precedent for non-legal, pedagogical, political, psychological, anthropological, 
and ethical reflection on the use of human rights law. Much of the moral conscience of humanity 
has been stored away in such law, and remains in that law ready to be retrieved by being 
interpreted as a statement of moral law. Historically, the concept of human rights arose as an 
ethical concept which preceded and inspired international human rights law. The ethical concept 
then led to a social, political, and pedagogical human rights movement, which only then led to 
the body of international human rights law as we know it. But the ethics and the movement never 
entirely dissolved into the law. Ethical human rights norms remain as the norms by which human 
rights law is justified, created, extended, qualified, or repealed. The movement remains the larger 
context of the law. It uses the law as a tool, and critically evaluates the law from various non-
legal perspectives. Thus the essays in this volume largely fall into what has come to be known as 
critical philosophy of law. 
 Michael Freeman is an example of a scholar working in human rights studies not limited 
to the discipline of law. He reflects that “the lawyers who dominate human rights studies” 
sometimes limit themselves to the view that “human rights are what human rights law says they 
are.”i He notes that “the concept of human rights is, to a considerable extent, though not wholly, 
legal,” and that “the UN introduced the concept of human rights into international law and 
politics.”ii But the UN introduced human rights into international law because they already had 
an important place in moral philosophy. Richard Pierre Claude, founding editor of Human Rights 
Quarterly, writes that “human rights are no longer the solitary domain of lawyers, but 
increasingly the central agenda for action and inquiry for thinking people worldwide.”iii Yet it is 
equally true that, because of international human rights law, human rights are no longer the 
solitary domain of ethicists. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child makes reference to itself as legally “binding” 
(Article 50). That is how the discipline of international law interprets the Convention, which 
should never be discounted. It is a strict constructionist textual interpretation of the wording of 
the law. But this formal interpretation of the legal text is only one way of interpreting it. If we 
take it as the only way of interpreting it, we discount the importance of complementing such an 
interpretation by contextual interpretation, specifically in the international social context in 
which the Convention is only weakly enforced. Thomas Hobbes and legal positivists generally 
have argued that text of the law is correctly interpreted contextually, sociologically, not merely 
textually. Wherever it is disobeyed with impunity, it is at most paper, not genuine law. 
From this perspective, what is a true legal text depends on going beyond the text to see 
whether penalties actually exist for disobeying it. The Convention is admittedly legally binding 
in the heaven of international human rights law, but that legal heaven is still far from fully 
coming down to earth. As a matter of sociological fact, the Convention clearly fails to bind the 
behavior of many nations that have nonetheless ratified it. But the less the Convention is able to 
justify itself as enforceable law, the greater the importance of shifting attention to its function as 
a pedagogical instrument and standard for further moral education. 
We need to be clear, however, about what it means to say the CRC is “legally binding.” It 
does not mean that all ratifying nations are legally bound to legislate the children’s rights in the 
Convention as domestic law. It means, rather, that ratifying nations are legally bound to 
participate in the monitoring procedure spelled out in the Convention. They are legally bound to 
show that they are trying to legally implement children’s rights, to file reports on their success in 
implementing those rights, to be examined by the UN Child Rights Committee, and to receive 
recommendations from the Committee. They are not legally bound to follow the 
recommendations or to actually pass domestic legislation, however great the displeasure which 
the Committee may show toward such countries in future reports. States sometimes feel 
conflicting pressures from different governmental or nongovernmental agents of the world 
human rights movement, and sometimes have to make hard decisions and set their own 
budgetary priorities.   
Yet even in this weaker sense of a “legally binding” human rights convention, the CRC 
fails to consistently bind in fact the action of ratifying nations that fail to submit reports in the 
required time frames, that submit frivolous or unresponsive reports, or that do not seriously 
attempt to follow the Committee’s recommendations. No punitive actions beyond shaming and 
blaming exist to enforce compliance with what nations have legally bound themselves to do. The 
Committee issues recommendations, but the CRC regime provides for no court empowered to 
issue legally binding verdicts. It may be difficult for the Committee to judge whether a nation 
has made serious efforts. In part this is because the Child Rights Committee can more easily 
verify concrete external governmental actions than the inner commitment of government office 
holders. And it may be difficult for the Committee to judge whether a government is justified in 
claiming it must limit funding for the promotion of children’s rights in favor of a higher level of 
funding for what it says is the more urgent promotion of other human rights. Human rights are 
said to be indivisible, not standing in a hierarchical order of priority. Yet actions on behalf of one 
right may be placed in a higher or lower level of priority than another right, depending on what is 
most urgent given the current situation of the nation.    
Part One of the volume explores ways in which the global children’s rights movement [including 
educators, social scientists, child psychologists] has positively interpreted and used the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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